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JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN
THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
GEORGE P. SMITH, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay is divided into five parts. The first will examine,
in broad-brush, bioethics as a discipline, language, and political
movement. The second explores the politics of morality and the
role bioethicists have in assisting with the tasks of judicial deci-
sionmaking. Part three tackles the feasibility of promoting a
deliberative democracy within the new Age of Biotechnology.
Part four considers forensic or scientific evidence. The final sec-
tion of this essay considers how Elizabeth Taylor, Reva Shane
Lewis of the CBS soap opera, Guiding Light, Thomas Donaldson,
and the sheep, "Dolly," shape the contours of this new Age of
Biotechnology and, indeed, present fascinating contemporary
paradigms of the diversity confronting the judicial system as it
attempts to cope with the startling advances of The New Biology.'
My major premise, minor premise, and conclusion are one
and the same for they conduce to an acceptance of the fact that
the social constructs and legal tools necessary for the modern
judiciary to meet head-on and deal with the contentious issues of
bioethics and biotechnology are already in place. To resolve
problems arising from these potential quagmires, perhaps the
major concern is for the courts to remain forever vigilant to the
interlinking relationships or synergistic forces found in law, sci-
ence, ethics, and medicine.2 Without vigilance and enhanced
awareness of the dynamic and fluid situation here, both the
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1. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, MONOGRAPH, DEVELOPING A STANDARD FOR
ADVANCING GENETIC HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION (1997); Burkhard
Bilger, In Living Color, the Gray Areas of Science, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at A13.
2. See generally George P. Smith, II, Biotechnology and The Law: Social
Responsibility or Freedom of Scientific Inquiry, 39 MERCER L. REV. 437 (1988);
George P. Smith, II, Toward an International Standard of Scientific Inquiry, 2
HEALTH MATRIX 167 (1992).
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bench and the bar "will increasingly lack understanding of the
questions to be asked, let alone the answers to be given" in this
New Age of Science.'
What is called for is a modified form of judicial activism-
not grounded in the heresy of deconstruction-but rather one
shaped by reason, understanding, and contemporary social pol-
icy and one that is calibrated by the scientific gatekeeping role of
the federal courts. When, owing to exigencies of time, laws
become largely impotent or even moribund, and new ones are
not enacted because of the legislator's lethargic passivity, igno-
rance, or failure to release themselves from the vortex of emo-
tionalism which enmeshes certain issues, then it remains for the
courts to seize the initiative and fill the void of indecisiveness.
Through interpretative policies guided by reason, common
sense, equity, and analogy, the courts can chart with confidence a
new common law of biotechnology-one that begins to build a
framework for principled decisionmaking upon which stability
and predictability can be assured. Absent this legal mechanism
or process of decisionmaking, it remains for science to direct the
future course of development for the new Age of Biotechnology
and law to remain a reactive force. Ideally, however, a full part-
nership of interest and action should be sought by law, science,
ethics, and medicine if progress is to be achieved over the suc-
ceeding years.
BIOETHICAL IMPERATIVES
Newton's Law
Sir Isaac Newton's third law of physics applies as much to
scientific advancement as it does to other aspects of life itself.
Accordingly, for each and every action there is an equal and
opposite reaction.4 For every new and daring biotechnological
advancement, a new medico-legal challenge is presented-a chal-
lenge rooted in complex social, religious, moral, and ethical vec-
tors of force.
3. See Michael D. Kirby, Human Rights-The Challenge of The New
Technology, 60 AUSTRALIA L.J. 170, 181 (1986). See generally David Shenk,
Biocapitalism: What Price the Genetic Revolution , 295 HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1997, at
37.
4. See VAN NOSTRAND'S SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 1972 (Douglas M.
Considine ed., 7th ed. 1989) for a discussion of Sir Isaac's Laws of Force and
Motion.
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Bioethical Concerns and Connections
Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence which
sets it apart as a distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individua-
tion derives from a de facto set of issues interrelated by what
might be termed "family resemblances." While a common
thread joining all of the issues is exceedingly difficult to find, the
central core comprising the list of these issues, without question,
is a felt concern over the technology of control of man's body,
his mind, and quality of life.
Many of the concerns of bioethics are concerns of public
policy-or with legislation and policy guidelines-at state, local,
and federal levels, that need to be enacted and enforced with
respect to all of the issues comprising the de facto set. It has
been suggested that bioethical concerns are but those prohibi-
tions all rational people urge everyone to follow in an effort to
avoid evils on which common agreement exists.
Outside the individual context of determining how one
treats another, for moral acceptability to be given at the broader
societal level, a democratic consensus must be reached acknowl-
edging that a certain good must be promoted though its promo-
tion causes some degree of harm. It is within this setting where
much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is focused. While indi-
vidual morality operates primarily within a system of restraints,
policies affecting society as a whole operate on a level where pro-
motion of good is a moral option. The pivotal question thus
becomes, "What goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific
research)?" Of necessity, priorities, values, and goods must be
weighed, balanced, and compared. Whenever the benefits and
the risks of a particular course of action are weighed, it is well
remembered that those very elements in the balancing test are
based upon judgments about values, with the penultimate goal
being the formulation and validation of a final action which min-
imizes human suffering and maximizes the social good.5
5. See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL,
SOCIO-LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAvE NEW WORLD (1993);
George P. Smith, II, Biomedicine and Bioethics: De Lege Lata, De Lege Ferenda, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233, 237 (1993); Norman Daniels et al., Is Justice
Enough? Ends and Means in Bioethics, 26 HASTINGS CR. REP. 9 (1996).
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A Political Movement
In a more specific sense, bioethics encompasses a whole
political movement.6 It is a movement which seeks to harness
political forces to deal with a plethora of ethical problems relat-
ing to health care delivery, both at the micro and the macro level
of economic distribution. It also endeavors to respond-often
through legislative reforms-to complex issues such as physician
assisted suicide, cryonic suspension, genetic discrimination in the
workplace, abortion, privacy, sterilization, human experimenta-
tion, collaborative reproduction by use of in vitro fertilization,
artificial insemination, cloning, and personal relationships neces-
sary to create a family by homosexuals and lesbians.
7
All too often, contemporary society's concerns over the need
for regulating ethical regimes to guide or even control these
activities has driven it in turn to seek medical laws about areas
such as death and dying, genetic counseling and screening,
reproductive technologies, and organ transplants. Often there is
little choice for legal passivity or inaction since "the law is a pri-
mary vehicle for resolving disagreements about public policy and
the treatment of real persons."8 And today, Americans seem to
be reshaping their political questions ultimately into judicial
questions.9 Yet, a healthy degree of skepticism is needed to see
the inherent limitations on the legal system in its efforts to regu-
late biomedical developments. 10 Each legal tool used must be
constantly fine-tuned and re-evaluated by ever changing public
policies-all with the purpose of determining which of the tools
is best fitted to deal with specific biomedical problems" and
which one validates a final action that ideally minimizes human
suffering and maximizes the social or common good.
6. See Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics in the Language of The Law, 24 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 16. See also ROGER W. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF LAW IN
BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING 5-7, 11 (1997).
7. See Schneider, supra note 6, at 16; DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 1, 2. See
also Dorothy C. Wertz, Society and The Not-So-New Genetics: What Are We Afraid Ofi?
Some Future Predictions From A Social Scientist, 13J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
299 (1997); George P. Smith, II & Roberto Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and The New
Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 263 (1984).
8. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 2.
9. See Schneider, supra note 6, at 16. See also George P. Smith, II,
Procreational Autonomy v. State Intervention: Opportunity or Crisis for a Brave New
World?, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 635 (1986).
10. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 2.
11. See id.
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The Future
An overriding concern of any study of applied bioethics over
the years to come is the extent to which diverse notions about
ethics and bioethics will be reconciled and, consequently,
whether a comprehensive moral philosophy of medicine will
emerge from this reconciliation. To date, philosophical
bioethics has dominated religious bioethics. As awareness of cul-
tural diversity intensifies, societal differences increase among cul-
tural groupings, and indeed, fundamentalism grows, it may well
be seen that religious values-which underlie public dialogue on
scientific issues within this group-will come to the forefront and
even dominate. 12
II. THE POLITICS OF MORALITY
Bioethicists as Expert Witnesses
Former President Ronald Reagan has observed that "politics
and morality are inseparable.""3 Consequently, since "morality's
foundation is religion, religion and politics are necessarily
related. We need religion as a guide; we need it because we are
imperfect."' 4 In this regard, it is well to recall the biblical admo-
nition that "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."' 5
In the realm of the New Biology, courts inevitably are being
required, either implicitly or explicitly, to take positions on one
or more complex moral issues. When situations as this occur, it
is arguably better for the judges forced with the responsibility for
making decisions to have an "informed understanding of the rel-
evant normative issues and available moral positions, than a
superficial, uninformed view."' 6
In a secular pluralist society, however, care must always be
taken by the courts to foreswear acceptance of any one claim to
intrinsic moral superiority. Rather, multiple moral perspectives
may be presented and evaluated when provided by a case in liti-
gation." Bioethicists, or those trained in analyzing and studying
moral issues, might well be considered as proper experts to assist
12. See David C. Thomasma, Edmund D. Pellegrino on The Future of Bioethics,
6 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 373 (1997).
13. Ronald Reagan, Politics and Morality are Inseparable, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 7, 10 (1984).
14. Id.
15. 2 Corinthians 3:17. See generally Pierre Schlag, Law as The Continuation
of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REv. 427 (1997).
16. E. Haavi Morreim, Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An Overview and
an Argument for Inevitability, 22J. MED. & PHIL. 291, 293 (1997).
17. See id. at 294, 295.
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the judiciary in probing these issues when they are cast inextrica-
bly within medico-legal cases.'" Very often, bioethicists are
sought as experts by courts for their expertise in moral argument
and persuasion.' 9
Yet, as Professor John C. Fletcher of the University of Vir-
ginia cautions, care must be taken to make a qualitative distinc-
tion between expertise about an ethical issue and expertise in
ethics (or making specific moral judgments). A vast scholarly
knowledge concerning particular issues does not, ipsofacto, trans-
late into any particular expertise in or ability to make either spe-
cific moral judgments or to pursue subsequent actions in
complex clinical cases. Stated simply, bioethicists should aspire
to obtain a level of expertise on particular issues and related pol-
icy options and avoid status classifications as "experts" in making
clinical case judgments. Rather, bioethicists should content
themselves to be expert consultants. 20
Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino of the Georgetown University
School of Medicine, no doubt the foremost Roman Catholic
bioethicist in the country, has cautioned that there is a real dan-
ger for the judiciary in relying upon ethics expert witnesses to
assist in reaching an ethical resolution of disputed, substantive,
or normative questions.21 The adversarial atmosphere found
within the courtroom all too often destroys the important peda-
gogical function of an ethics expert; the clinical experiences and
vast knowledge of prevailing ethical practices, together with the
experts' analytical skills in assessing moral arguments, are all
called into question and challenged on complex legal grounds.2 2
Equally as important for Dr. Pellegrino is his belief that "the role
of the courts is to resolve legal, not moral disputes."23 Accord-
ingly, he argues that when matters of morality underpin law,
"they should be argued as widely and openly as possible when a
law is being framed and not in the narrower arena of a court
proceeding." 24
18. See id.
19. SeeJohn C. Fletcher, Bioethics in a Legal Forum: Confessions of an Expert
Witness, 22J. MED. & PHIL. 297, 318 (1997).
20. See id. at 317.
21. See Virginia A. Sharpe & Edmund D. Pellegrino, Medical Ethics in the
Courtroom: A Reappraisal, 22 J. MED. & PHIL. 373, 378 (1997).
22. See id. at 374, 378.
23. Id. at 378.
24. Id. at 379. See also Neomi Rao, A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of
Philosophers by the Supreme Court, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371 (1998) (arguing that the
Court should base its decisions on precedent, on history, and on recognition of
the judicial limits of authority, and stay away from philosophical straight
jackets).
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By assuming the role of a non-activist, passive umpire in
bioethical cases, and thereby deferring to hoped-for legislative
initiatives, the courts-all too often-foredoom a passive legisla-
tive lethargy which may guarantee years of inaction and uncer-
tainty. Obviously, each court must balance its responsibility to
interpret the existing laws using contemporary standards of jus-
tice with its responsibility to delegate lawmaking responsibilities
to legislatures. Yet the judiciary must be mindful that it has, in a
very real way, a shared responsibility for lawmaking with the legis-
lature; under the common law tradition, the courts have a clear
and decisive role to play in not only interpreting but in shaping
new policies and laws.25
Even with the growing dominance of legislation, common
law adjudication-both at the state and federal levels of govern-
ment-remains a vital form of lawmaking. 26 Yet, it is to be
remembered that, from a conservative or traditional viewpoint,
Common law judges have no power to issue advisory opin-
ions or proffer generalized codes of conduct. They have
no power to rule for the future even about problems that
seem certain to arise. This means that for the common law
to deal with a technology the technology must exist and
have operated in a way that angered someone enough for
that person to have claimed injury and sought legal
redress. Thus, to the extent that a rapid response or a
response in advance to a biosocial development is impor-
tant, the common law cannot provide it. Common law is
reactive, not proactive.
2 7
Science and Religion
The two great systems of human thought are science and
religion. The predominant influence over the conduct of most
individuals may be said to be religion. When science intrudes
into daily life it does not make its presence felt intellectually, but
rather through technology.2 8 Although there is a religious per-
spective present in the lives of most, religion's stylized, institu-
tionalized role has declined sharply over the years. While
traditional Christian doctrines are being displaced from personal
consciousness, they are not being replaced by rational scientific
25. See Morreim, supra note 16, at 293.
26. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 7, 8.
27. Id. at 9. See also Schneider, supra note 6, at 17, 19.
28. See PAUL DAVIES, GOD AND THE NEW PHYwsIcs 1 (1983).
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thought, for science is just as elusive and inaccessible to the pub-
lic as organized religions. 29
Because contemporary existence has been altered dramati-
cally by scientific achievement through technological applica-
tions, lives are changed radically-with the corresponding
conclusion that traditional religions often appear to be lacking in
modern relevance in resolving both personal and social
problems.
If the Church is largely ignored today it is not because sci-
ence has finally won its age-old battle with religion, but because it
has so radically re-oriented our society that the biblical perspec-
tive of the world now seems largely irrelevant. As one television
cynic recently remarked, few of our neighbors possess an ox or
an ass for us to covet.30
The deep questions of existence are approached differently
by science and religion. While science is based on both careful
observation and experimentation which in turn allow for theo-
ries to be constructed connecting different experiences, religion
asserts unalterable truths which cannot be modified to accommo-
date changing ideas. Accordingly, the true believer stands by his
faith regardless of whatever evidence may be deduced against its
efficacy.3 ' Yet for the scientist, if scientific irregularities prove a
theory to be fallacious, it will be abandoned and a new approach
adopted.32
Science and Technology
The reality of social behavior is that science and technology
are the great engines of modern times, and these engines drive
and force constant change. Far from becoming simpler, the very
real promise of science and technology is that they will become
more difficult and, indeed, unyielding. Finding definitive solu-
tions to both the tendentious problems and the opportunities
they present is especially difficult since no "solution" can ever be
taken as final-this because "with changing technology come
changing dimensions of the problems."33
Indeed, error has a high pragmatic value in science, for it is
viewed as but the process of induction. Science, then, cannot be
29. See id.
30. Id. at 2.
31. See id. at 6.
32. See id. See generally, George P. Smith, II, Pathways to Immortality in the
New Millennium: Human Responsibility, Theological Direction or Legal Mandate, 15
ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 447 (1996).
33. Michael D. Kirby, Health Law and Ethics, 5 J.L. & MED. 31, 34-35
(1997). See generally LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN (1997).
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seen as a mere collection of facts. Rather, it is to be framed,
initially, by a question or a set of questions. "Most often the labor
begins with a wrong hypothesis; experiment exposes the fallacy;
the question is refrained and confronted with experiment until
at last the wisely framed question leads to a new finding sup-
ported by secure evidence." 4
Chief Justice Warren Burger held to the view that law and
ethical standards are not proper subjects of research and discov-
ery. Rather, they must be considered to be the fruits of slow evo-
lutionary processes. "The law," he opined, "does not search out
as do science and medicine; it reacts to social needs and
demands."35 Law is but a means, a tool, and not an end in itself.
Accordingly, "tools are not ordinarily made to hammer out solu-
tions to hypothetical problems but for real problems, which
means that the problem must arise, exist, and be recognized
before the law reacts to provide a solution."3 6
Law's Purpose
There is general agreement that the principal purpose of
law is not only to define and protect individual rights and ensure
public order, but to resolve disputes and redistribute wealth and
thereby optimize economic efficiency.3  Additionally, laws
should dispense justice, provide a structure for preventing or
compensating injury, and be "a lever for moving human behav-
ior.""8 Accordingly, all legal systems may be viewed correctly as
existing "to effect some change in human behavior."3 9 By seek-
ing to alter socio-cultural influences, law can truly shape and
reshape behavior.4"
As observed, law is the language of social regulation.4" It
thus obeys systemic imperatives often irrelevant and in conflict
with efforts to achieve a genuine understanding and wise resolu-
tion of moral issues.42 As a language, law competes with other
languages of religion and morality, of love and friendship, of cus-
34. GERARD PIEL, SCIENCE IN THE CAUSE OF MAN 94, 95 (1961).
35. Warren E. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, in 1
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE NEW WORLD 211, 211
(George P. Smith, II ed., 1982). See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, MONOGRAPH,
ETHICAL IMPERATIVES IN LAW AND MEDICINE (1997).
36. Burger, supra note 35, at 211.
37. See Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of
Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 167 (1997).
38. Id. at 167.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 168.
42. See Schneider, supra note 6, at 22.
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tom and compromise, and of pragmatism and social accommo-
dation. These other languages are spoken more comfortably,
fluently, and with more conviction in daily life than the language
of law.43
III. TowARD AN ETHIC OF OPENNESS AND PARTICIPATION
As a way to meet and possibly even lift the veil of ignorance
and suspicion from the biotechnological sciences, it has been
suggested that the scientific ethic of openness be recovered.
This ethic holds to the idea that not everything worth doing must
be done secretly and at top speed.44 Indeed, open dialogue
among members of scientific, philosophical, ethical, and general
communities at large is crucial before and during the time
"biomedical genies" are released from their bottles-not after-
wards. When the culture of science changes in this respect and
becomes more open, the chances of socio-medico-legal misdirec-
tions and even mishaps are minimized significantly.45
Deliberative Democracy
As more bioethical conflicts arise over issues such as abor-
tion, physician-assisted suicide, patient autonomy, and informed
consent, controversies will proliferate. No doubt then, the cen-
tral question raised is what is the proper foundation upon which
informed bioethical debates can be undertaken. Deliberative
democracy has come into vogue recently, and been advanced as
the foundation upon which this dialogue can commence.46
With the central purpose of deliberative democracy being to
promote the legitimacy of collective decisions,4 7 this concept
seeks to expand both the number and use of deliberative forums
where citizens may enter into discourse over the contentious
issues of the new Age of Biotechnology. Through moral disa-
greement comes ideally a "manifest mutual respect" for opposing
views, or in other words, mutually respectful decisionmaking.4 8
43. See id. at 21.
44. See Arthur Caplin, Why Don't They Love Us Anymore?, 2 Newsletter,
Center for Bioethics, Univ. of Pa. at 4 (Spring 1997).
45. See generally Symposium, Genetics and the Law: The Ethical, Legal and
Social Implications of Genetic Technology and Biomedical Ethics, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 416 (1996). See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Scientists Seek Panel's Advice on In-
Womb Genetic Tests, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1998, at A2.
46. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Deliberating About Bioethics, 27
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 38 (1997). See also Weiss, supra note 45.
47. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 46, at 39.
48. See id. at 40.
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Through subsequent deliberating stages of debate, leaders
in turn present their proposals, citizens respond, revisions are
made, citizen reaction is received, and the stages recur. The best
example of this process is seen in Oregon's efforts in the early
1990s to structure priorities for publicly funded health care
under Medicaid. Initially, the priorities list designed by the Ore-
gon Health Services Commission was shaped primarily by utilita-
rian cost-benefit calculations. Encountering much public
criticism, a comprehensive process of consultation was under-
taken which gave the Commission an opportunity to have wide
community outreach through open meetings. With further
deliberations by the Commission, a revised list was drawn up and
submitted and was regarded generally as a marked improvement
over the original plan.49
Deliberative democracy, viewed as but a complement to the
legislative process, is an attractive idea. The principal drawback
to its effective implementation is that the average, ordinary, rea-
sonable American is not sufficiently informed to enter into
meaningful discourse on the ramifications of the new Age of Bio-
technology. Logic is all too often put on "hold" while emotional
feelings control and often resolve the debate.5" Similarly, hard
economic realities are repeatedly ignored or postponed until the
time their ultimate and forced implementation causes more dis-
cord and havoc than would have occurred if they had been con-
sidered as a first order priority.5'
Stated otherwise, perhaps the greatest single reason why-
even with an ethic of openness within a deliberative democracy-
little constructive debate can occur at the community level is the
inability of the public to understand the language of the scien-
tists, or in other words, the language of statistics.52 Given an
unsophisticated citizenry, it becomes even more important for
the courts and the legislatures to recognize their joint responsi-
bility to fill the breach.53
49. See id. at 41.
50. See George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical
Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REv. 658, 733
passim (1995) (discussing the demise of the average, ordinary, reasonable
person).
51. See Stephen F. Williams, Limits to Economics as a Norm for Judicial
Decisions, 21 HAtv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39 (1997).
52. See Robert Schwartz, Genetic Knowledge: Some Legal and Ethical Questions,
in BIRTH TO DEATH: SCIENCE AND BIOETHICS 25 (David C. Thomasma &
Thomasine Kushner eds., 1996).
53. See id.
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IV. SCIENTIFIC GATEKEEPING
Experts in Scientific Evidence
It is agreed, generally, that the reliability of evidence derived
from a scientific principle depends upon three factors: "(1) the
validity of the underlying theory; (2) the validity of the technique
applying that theory and (3) the proper application of the tech-
nique on a particular occasion."54 Thus, neither an invalid tech-
nique nor a valid technique applied improperly will yield reliable
results.
In February, 1998, at a meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer cautiously encouraged the developing practice among
some federal judges of appointing independent experts to assist
in evaluating highly technical and scientific evidentiary proofs.55
Since 1923 with the case of Frye v. United States, 6 and more
definitively with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals7 in 1993,
the courts have struggled with decisions regarding what informa-
tion to admit or exclude as evidence involving scientific disputes.
Indeed, ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion in Daubert, in which he
concurred in part and dissented in part, recognized the
gatekeeping responsibility of judges under Rule 702 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, but observed that this responsibility does
not impose "on them either the obligation or the authority to
become amateur scientists in order to perform that role."58
Relevance, admissibility, weight, and sufficiency of evidence
are the most significant concepts in the law's epistemology.
Therefore, since scientific expert testimony is evidence, it is sub-
ject to scrutiny under each of these four classifications. The sci-
entific reliability of scientific evidence was, under Daubert, made
the very benchmark of its admissibility.5" Thus, the very purpose
54. PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
2d at §1.1 (1993). See generally FED. JuD. CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE (1994); Symposium: International Perspectives on Scientific Evidence, 30
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941 (1997).
55. See Breyer Cautiously Endorses Use of Neutral Experts, WASH. POST, Feb. 17,
1998, at A2.
56. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
57. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
58. See id. at 600, 601. See also D.H. KAE, SCIENCE 75-77, 87-99 (1997).
The framework for principled decisionmaking which the Supreme Court has
constructed for the admission of scientific evidence includes Federal Rules of
Evidence 104(a), 201(b), 401, 402, 403, 702, 703 and 706(a) as well as Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a) and 56.
59. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process,
107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1542 (1998).
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of the Daubert rule, then, was to reduce-if not eliminate-the
flow of "crank science" into the adjudicative processes.6 °
In Frye the solution to evaluating scientific expert testimony
was thought to be found by simply having the courts rely upon
credentialed scientists in order to determine whether so-called
"experts" were properly credentialed. This, of course, presents a
vexatious quandary: if nonscientific, nonexpertjudges and juries
are not regarded as competent to judge the content of expert
information, how then are they to be recognized as competent to
judge credentials of those who would give expert information?6 1
Epistemic competence may be thought of correctly as but a
matter of degree-for not all experts are equally competent, just
as not all non-experts are equally epistemically incompetent.62
Sadly, a putative expert's demeanor or ethos, training in speech
and theater, ability to convey a "glow" to otherwise acceptable
positions and exude confidence as well as seem sincere and con-
vincing are all too often evaluated at a higher level than is an
expert's medical expertise.6 3
The central concern emerging from this inquiry, then, is
how a scientifically untrained judge becomes sufficiently compe-
tent to perform the gatekeeping task set by Daubert.64 "Moreover,
assuming the judge admits the evidence, how could a scientifi-
cally untrained trier of fact, whetherjudge or jury, be sufficiently
epistemically competent to assess competing putatively scientific
claims by competing expert witnesses when, ex hypothesis, that fact
finder does not have the requisite expertise to judge the evi-
dence itself?."
65
In 1997, writing for the majority in the case of General Electric
v. Jones,66 ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist ruled that a district
court's determination-based on scientific evidence-should be
upheld unless it is demonstrated to be manifestly erroneous.
This standard, more commonly known as "an abuse of discre-
tion," applies generally to the entire spectrum of a trial court's
evidentiary rulings.6 7
Although the majority fails to explore in depth the judge's
gatekeeping role, an insightful concurrence by Justice Stephen
Breyer sets forth some concrete steps to be taken in order to
60. See id. at 1631.
61. See id. at 1627.
62. See id. at 1678.
63. See id. at 1622 passim.
64. See id. at 1551-52.
65. Id. at 1552.
66. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
67. See id. at 517.
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allow judges to conscientiously meet their roles as evidentiary
gatekeepers. Admonishing the judiciary to exercise with special
care its gatekeeping duties (e.g., determining whether particular
testimony is reliable) when law and science intersect, 68 Justice
Breyer lists four important guidelines. First, he suggests the dis-
trictjudge use the pre-trial conference, under Rule 16 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. This Rule allows the judge to
narrow the scientific issues in dispute.69 Second, judges should
use pre-trial hearings when they have the opportunity to examine
potential experts."y  Third, the court should consider the
appointment of a special master or specially trained law clerks."'
Finally, Justice Breyer suggests that judges employ Rule 76 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to appoint their own experts.72
While observing that the United States Supreme Court
received sixty amicus curiae briefs during its 1997 term which
allowed professional organizations and others to offer written
opinions and facts about scientific controversies before the court,
Justice Breyer has applauded a five year pilot project to be under-
taken by the American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence which will seek to develop lists of neutral experts and place
them, upon request, with federal judges.73
The French Technocrat
In France, a new class of legal decisionmakers has been
given formal recognition as "technocrats." Although given spe-
cial training in science, mathematics, physics, chemistry, eco-
nomics, law, decision theory, and administration, it is an
overstatement to conclude these individuals create a system dif-
ferent from the United States where scientists make those deci-
sions that judges and juries would make normally. Rather, the
French technocrat is trained to be a generalist manager-one
whose skills in management and organizational decisionmaking
give him the "competence with science to comprehend its use in
policy decisions."74 Although not comprising an elite scientific
cadre, "it does seem clear that they are far better trained in scien-
tific matters than the average American judge or juror. 75
68. See id. at 519.
69. See id. at 520.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Breyer Cautiously Endorses Use of Neutral Experts, supra note 55.
74. Brewer, supra note 59, at 1566 n.128.
75. Id.
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Perhaps it would be well for the American judiciary to study
whether this French approach to judicial administration would
have a practical value in the U.S. court system.
A New Court of Biological Science
It may be practical at this time to revisit and possibly reshape
the idea first proposed by Professor Arthur Kantrowitz in 1967 of
structuring a Science Court7 6 and elevating the idea today to the
status of a Biological-Bioethical Science Court.
. Among the very positive achievements of the rather short-
lived presidency of Gerald Ford was the creation of a presidential
advisory group to study new advances in science and technology.
In 1976, the task force issued an interim report77 and took up the
idea of how a structure or mechanism could be created whereby
the scientific bases for controversial public policy could be
resolved when technical disputes arose between biased experts.7 8
The task force concluded that the basic mechanism needed for
reform was an adversary hearing which would be open to the
public and be governed by a disinterested referee. The "expert"
proponents of opposing scientific positions would present their
cases before a panel of scientist-judges-with the judges them-
selves being drawn from consultations with scientific societies
and other professional organizations, and in no way subject to
personal bias with an organizational affiliation with parties work-
ing in the area of dispute. 9
After evidence is heard, questioned, and defended, three-
judge panels would proceed to prepare a report on the dispute,
noting the points upon which the advocates agree and reaching
judgments where disputed statements of fact are at issue. Their
jurisdiction would also allow specific research projects to be sug-
gested as a method of clarifying unsettled points.80
76. See Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment,
156 SCIENCE 763 (1967).
77. Task Force of The Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated
Advances in Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim
Report, 193 SCIENCE 653 (1976) [hereinafter Task Force]. President Reagan
endorses the finding of this task force. See Presidential Candidates Answer Science-
Policy Questions, PHYSics TODAY, Oct. 1980, at 49, 50.
78. See Allan Mazur, The Science Court: Reminiscence and Retrospective, 4 RisK
161 (1993).
79. See Jeffrey N. Martin, Procedures for Decisionmaking Under Conditions of
Scientific Uncertainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 443, 451
(1979).
80. See Task Force, supra note 77, at 653.
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The whole idea of a Science Court then, and as restructured
here into a Biological Science or Bioethics Court, would be to
reduce the extension of authority beyond competence and
thereby avoid what has been defined as tyranny."' Stated other-
wise, the whole point of a new science court proposal would be-
much as it was proposed years ago-to allow for a structured pro-
cess whereby separate biological and scientific issues could be
analyzed by experts on science and policy questions and, in turn,
be evaluated by public representatives charged with making
informed policy choices. Informed gatekeeping could then be a
practical, rather than aspirational, goal for the judiciary to set
and achieve.8 2 No final scientific answers would be forthcoming
in a Science Court. Rather, conclusions would be reached by
reliable procedures which in turn would demonstrate those rea-
sonable steps taken to ensure "the best possible provisional
answer" is given.
8 3
Reconsidering the feasibility of a Biological Science Court
certainly forces a need to perhaps revisit, as well, whether a spe-
cialized court for the environment would also enhance the effi-
cient, expeditious administration of justice.84
V. PARADIGMS OF THE NEW BIOLOGY
Decorporation
While PeterJennings may have surprised his ABC news audi-
ence on the evening of April 27, 1998, with his report on body
transplants, Professor Robert J. White of the Case Western
Reserve Medical School has been experimenting since the early
1960s with first isolating monkey brains85 and, more recently,
with several decorporated heads.86 Indeed, in 1971, a group of
Cleveland neurosurgeons transplanted successfully several mon-
key heads onto the bodies of other monkeys and then proceeded
to revive the transplanted heads to a state of full consciousness
81. See id.
82. See James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REv.
1058, 1064 (1977).
83. See id. at 1058.
84. See George P. Smith, II, The Environment and the Judiciary: A Need for Co-
operation and Reform, 3 B.C. ENvTL. Arr. L. REv. 627 (1974); Scott C. Whitney,
The Case for Creating A Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV.
473 (1973).
85. See generally RobertJ. White et al., Isolation of The Monkey Brain: In Vitro
Preparation and Maintenance, 141 SCIENCE 1060 (1963) (detailing the isolation
and sustained viability of five rhesus monkey brains).
86. See Robert J. White et al., Cephalic Exchange Transplantation in the
Monkey, 70 SURGERY 135 (1971).
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for some thirty-six hours. And, according to any reasonable defi-
nition of what being alive for the brain is (e.g., generation of
brain waves), the scientific procedure was recorded as a
success.
87
Interestingly, U.S. Patent Number 4,666,425 is for a device
for perfusing an animal head. More specifically, the invention
relates to both a method and device for providing a physical and
biomedical level of support for decorporated heads."' It is specu-
lated, furthermore, that maintenance of a severed human head
would not be that difficult of an undertaking.
8 9
Technically, once achieved, the severed and conscious
human head would have a mental capacity approximately the
same as a quadriplegic and might well suffer-rather predict-
ably-from analogous problems of depression over the loss of a
functioning healthy body and, of course, varying degrees of isola-
tion from people not willing to accommodate or accept them.
Using voice controlled computer systems and other devices
adapted to quadriplegic life, decorporated heads could be
afforded a surprising degree of autonomy.9 °
Words such as "alive," "comatose," and "dead" are all used
properly to describe a severed head. Thus, if a head were able to
see, think, and talk, would it be improper for it to be considered
alive? In many respects, the individual who is paralyzed below
the neck is in the same state as a decorporated head and always
regarded as being alive. Indeed, the word "paralyzed," while
being a valid adjective, does not deny definitionally or taxonomi-
cally such people are still alive.9
Accordingly, the word "decorporated" could be used to ref-
erence those whose heads are severed in much the exact same
way as the word "paralyzed" is used-certainly not as a word con-
noting or denoting a denial of life but, instead, merely adjectival
to acknowledge a certain life condition. So long as a severed
head is conscious and communicative, it may be regarded prop-
erly as alive. Once consciousness is lost, however, the head would
then fit the definition of comatose. Eventually, with the loss of
87. See White, supra note 85, at 1061.
88. See generally CHET FLEMING, IF WE CAN KEEP A SEVERED HEAD
ALIVE ... : DISCORPORATION AND U.S. PATENT 4,666,425 (1998).
89. See id. at 30-31. See also ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings
(ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 1998).
90. See Chet Fleming, If We Can Keep a Severed Head Alive: A Response to
Belliotti's Review, 4 BIOETHICS 162, 163 (1990). See generally Robert Bahr, A New
Ethical Question: Head Transplants?, SCIENCE Dic., May 1977, at 76 (discussing
ethical and physical challenges of transplanting heads).
91. See Fleming, supra note 88, at 30.
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brain waves and the cessation of molecular reactions, the head is
then to be seen as dead-regardless of whether blood is still
being pumped through it.
9 2
Elizabeth Taylor
Elizabeth Taylor decided, reportedly in 1990, that she would
combine decorporation with cryonic suspension and ultimate
cloning. Educated to these new scientific advances by her friend
Michael Jackson, Ms. Taylor will, at death, allow her head to be
removed surgically from her body and stored in a specially
designed container termed a "cryostat" where it will first be
packed in ordinary ice and placed subsequently in dry ice where
its temperature will be lowered to minus 109 degrees Fahrenheit.
Ultimately, the head will be cooled by liquid nitrogen to minus
320 degrees where it will be stored long term. 93 These neuro-
suspensions cost $50,000. Alcor, one of four cryotoriums in the
country, has presently twenty-two neuro-suspensions and thirteen
whole bodies.9 4 In America, altogether, there are some seventy-
three suspended humans, with fewer than one thousand
worldwide.9 5
At an appropriate scientific time, Ms. Taylor's head could be
used-at least theoretically-to regenerate, from a single cell, a
new clone of her. Alternatively, her head could be transplanted
to a reanimated cadaver with a body free from drug, alcohol, and
food addictions that plagued her originally. The National Enquirer
magazine quoted Ms. Taylor as saying upon her revival or regen-
eration, she would be finally "able to live the life I've always
wanted, without a body constantly racked by pain and discom-
92. See id. at 30-31. Under the Uniform Brain Death Act of 1978, section
1 states that "an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all
functioning of the brain, including the brain stem, is dead." Unif. Brain Death
Act §1, 12 U.L.A. 65 (Supp. 1996). A decorporated entity under this proposed
law could be recognized arguably as alive.
Under section 1 the 1980 Uniform Determination of Death Act, "an
individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead." Unif. Determination of Death Act,
§1, 12 U.L.A. 593 (Supp. 1996). Accordingly, under part one of this Act, a
decorporated entity would be dead legally, because of the clear loss of
circulatory and respiratory functions. Yet under part two, the animated brain
would be alive and thus, the person arguably still alive. See generally DavidJ. Roy
et al., Death, Dying and the Brain, 13 PRsMARv CARE 367 (1986).
93. SeeJerome George et al., Liz' Crackpot Plan for Eternal Life, NATIONAL
ENQUIRER, Jan. 16, 1990, at 50.
94. See Clint O'Connor, Putting Death on Ice: Cryonicists Preserving Bodies for
a Possible Thaw, Second Chance at Life, PLAIN DEALER, June 15, 1997, at 1J.
95. See id.
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fort."96 She is reported to have continued saying that she would
not have "to turn to drugs and alcohol to escape" the miseries of
life and she could eat whatever she wanted in her new state.97
Thomas Donaldson
Thomas Donaldson, a forty-six year old resident of Santa
Barbara County, California, believed to be dying because of an
inoperable malignant brain tumor, made newspaper headlines in
1990 when he sought judicial recognition of his right to self-
determination by seeking to be "suspended" before he was pro-
nounced legally dead.9" Before the tumor spread throughout his
brain and damaged it irretrievably, he wanted his head to be sev-
ered from his body and placed in cryonic suspension. Together
with samples of tissue and blood, Mr. Donaldson expected, over
time, that his body would be regrown. With other individuals
using cryonic suspension, the suspension had been performed
after they were pronounced dead. Here, Mr. Donaldson sought
to have what he asserted was his constitutionally protected right
to be cryonically suspended pre-mortem. In order to complete the
suspension, Donaldson petitioned the State of California to
exculpate those physicians and their assistants who, in reality,
would be assisting in his murder-suicide.99
On January 29, 1992, the California Court of Appeals denied
Mr. Donaldson's request to have his body cryogenically preserved
pre-mortem, or before his terminal illness caused death.1 °0 Charac-
terizing Donaldson's request as profoundly different from the
physician-assisted withdrawal of life-support systems in the more
traditional right-to-die cases, the court stated that one placed on
life-support systems takes a "detour" that normally postpones an
immediate encounter with death-with the withdrawal of treat-
96. George et al., supra note 93, at 50.
97. See id.
98. See Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). See
also Cynthia Gorney, Frozen Dreams: A Matter of Death and Life, WASH. POST, May
1, 1990, at DI (discussing Thomas Donaldson's attempt to have his body
cryogenically suspended pre-rnortem).
99. See Gorney, supra note 98. See also Robert W. Pommer, III, Donaldson
v. Van de Kamp: Cryonics, Assisted Suicide, and the Challenges of Medical Science, 9J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 589, 590 (1993) (explaining how the Donaldson
court rejected the argument that the right to die cases allowed a patient to
receive cryonic suspension before his natural death, but instead characterized
the request as tantamount to physician-assisted suicide). For further discussion
of the history and legal and medical aspects of cryonic suspension, see GEORGE
P. SMITH, II, MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRYONIcS: PROSPECTS FOR IMMORTALITY
1-35 (1983).
100. See Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60.
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ment merely allowing a delayed death to occur.1"' With the Don-
aldson case, however, no life-extending measures would have
been discontinued. Instead, a third party would have been
allowed to kill Mr. Donaldson and thereby hasten Donaldson's
ultimate death encounter. Observing that such actions have
never been given judicial recognition or validated by statute, the
court refused to act in such a manner. Under the facts, the court
went on to recognize the legitimate state interest in protecting
society from allowing third parties to either aid or abet suicide,
and held that Mr. Donaldson's assistant could not aid, advise, or
encourage Donaldson's own suicide."0 2
Shortly, after this ruling by the Court of Appeals, Mr. Don-
aldson's cancer went into remission. And, as ofJune 15, 1997, he
was still in remission.1
0 3
Reva Shane Lewis
The CBS continuing afternoon drama, Guiding Light, has
recently introduced television viewers to a fascinating plot
wherein the leading lady in the series, Reva Shane Lewis, was
cloned by a grieving husband who thought his original Reva had
died in a plane crash. With great dramatic scripting, the original
Reva survives and now must compete with her clone to reestab-
lish herself as the one true Reva. The misguided scientist who
created Reva's clone is now torn between taking the high ethical
road and placing a self-imposed moratorium on his further
research into this field or unwittingly falling into the snares of
the unscrupulous entrepreneur, Alan Spalding, who would like
to not only clone himself but become a cloning magnate.
The continuing point of wonderment must be the extent to
which life imitates scientific art or art merely imitates life on the
biological edges. There can be little doubt that, in a very real
sense, Guiding Light has become a bioethical laboratory.
Dolly
When in February, 1996, Scottish scientists documented
proof that for the first time an adult mammal was cloned in the
101. See id. at 63.
102. See id. at 63-65; George P. Smith, II, supra note 32, at 465-67. See
generally George P. Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted
Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination ?, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 275
(1989).
103. See O'Connor, supra note 94, at 1J.
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person of a sheep named Dolly,1" 4 both national and interna-
tional concerns were raised that this startling achievement could
well presage the ability to clone human beings.10 5
Although not verified scientifically, a claim by a scientist
from Geneva, Switzerland, Dr. Erhard S. Hiestand, asserted a
genetically engineered headless human clone has been created
in Japan and was to be used to supply organs for transplant
surgery.'0 6
Earlier this year, Chicago scientist G. Richard Seed
announced his intention to clone a human being.'07 And in New
York, another scientist, Stuart A. Newman, applied for a patent
on a method for making creatures that are part human and part
animal, called chimeras.' °8 While U.S. Patent Office policy for-
bids granting patents on human beings and is thus consistent
with the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery, the Pat-
ent Office has never been faced, until now, with the issue of the
extent to which an animal could be human before determined to
be worthy of patent protection.'0 9
104. See Rick Weiss, Scottish Scientists Clone Adult Sheep, WASH. PosT, Feb.
24, 1997, at Al; Rick Weiss, Animals in U.S. and Europe Now Pregnant With Clones;
Methods Mimic Those That Created Dolly, WASH. POST, June 28, 1997, at Al
(discussing Dr. Ian Wilmut's cloning of the sheep named Dolly and attempts to
replicate the experiment with sheep in other species). See also Rick Weiss,
Japanese Clone 8 Calves From Cow: New Process Shows Commercial Potential, WASH.
POST, Dec. 9, 1998, at Al (discussing the "most efficient application of cloning
technology" to date, the successful cloning of several calves from a single adult
Cow).
105. See Weiss, Scottish Scientists Clone Adult Sheep, supra note 104. See also
Mona S. Amer, Breaking the Mold: Human Embryo, Cloning and Its Implications for a
Right to Individuality, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1659 (1996) (discussing the benefits,
complexities and derivative property rights arising from blastomere
separation); Will Cloning Beget Disaster?, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1997, at A14
(describing views of theologians and scientists regarding the cloning of
mammals). See generally Scientific Discoveries in Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health & Safety of the Senate Comm. on Labor
& Human Resources, 105th Cong. 22 (1997) (statement of George J. Annas,
Professor and Chair of Boston Univ. Health Law Dept.).
106. See Mike Foster, Scientists Create Headless Human Clone ... So They Can
Harvest Its Body Parts, WKLv. WoRLD NEWS, Jan. 13, 1998, at 40-41.
107. See Rick Weiss, Scientist Plans to Clone Humans, WASH. POST, Jan. 7,
1998, at A3. See also Rick Weiss, Cloned Human Embryo Created, South Korean
Researchers Say: Announcement is Not Accompanied by Any Scientific Evidence, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 1998, at A3 (discussing researchers' claim to have cloned from a
30-year old woman a human embryo, which they later destroyed).
108. See Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human Creatures,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 2, 1998, at A12.
109. See id. See generally Rick Weiss, What is Patently Offensive? Policy on
'Immoral' Inventions Troubles Legal, Medical Professionals, WASH. POST, May 11,
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Clonal propagation, or artificially induced sexual reproduc-
tion, is characterized by the creation of individuals derived from
a single parent and identical, in genetic profile, to that parent.
Accordingly, those derived from only a single parent-without
benefit of origin from sexual congress-are recognized as mem-
bers of the same clone. Throughout the plant and microbial
(e.g., bacteria) kingdoms, as well as in many lower animals (e.g.,
earthworms), examples of clonal reproduction may be seen.1"1
Research into artificial sexual reproductive techniques, and
more specifically, cloning, is said to "go to the very nature of the
individuality which is implicit in any legal order .. .""' Accord-
ingly, ethical and religious objections tie to the nature of cloning
as being an unreasonable and "unnatural" interference with
"normal" procreative processes. 112 It is not only a form of
inbreeding but is said to endanger evolutionary development
and the very values of human diversity which come from it.' 13
Fears of the degradation of parenthood, then, and the dehu-
manization of man by the promotion of genetic bondage or slav-
ery as a consequence of genetically engineering individuals
according to preconceived designs, underscore the conclusion
that human cloning is a direct assault on the principle of the
sanctity of human life.114
1998, at A21 (discussing the extent to which moral criteria may or should be
applied in deciding to grant a patent for animal-human hybrids).
110. See Francis C. Pizzulli, Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic
Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 476, 482 (1974).
111. Id. at 499. See generally John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity and Human
Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1371 (1998) (discussing the ethical, legal and policy
justifications and criticisms of human cloning).
112. See Pizzulli, supra note 110, at 499.
113. See id. at 560. A British scientific panel recommended research into
the cloning of human embryos be allowed, thereby advancing the idea that a
genetic spare parts industry for damaged human bodies may be feasible. The
panel was, however, careful to state that human cloning should never be
allowed. See T.R. Reid, British Panel Supports Research on Cloning, WASH. POST,
Dec. 9, 1998, at A28.
114. See A Continuation of The National Discussion on Human Cloning:
Hearings on Ethics and Theology Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health & Safety of the
Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997). See generally
Vincent Kiernan, The Morality of Cloning Humans: Theologians and Philosophers
Offer Provocative Arguments, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 18, 1997, at A13
(discussing opposing moral and ethical views and potential consequences of
human cloning); Bill Broadway, A Rush to Judgment on Human Cloning? U-Va.
Scholar Warns Not Enough Is Known to Ban Procedure Permanently, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 1998, at C8 (discussing politicians' and academics' concerns regarding a
permanent ban on human cloning).
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Behind these ethical concerns lie the constitutional values of
privacy and of personal autonomy-the protection of which is
surely a valid secular purpose for legislation. Any state purpose
then, that protects the sanctity of human life contains a combina-
tion of religious, moral, and secular purposes. If, for example, a
legislative ban of cloning achieved a coalescence of these pur-
poses, it might well be expected to encounter difficulty in the
courts-especially those which do not view "morality legislation"
as proper. Indeed, some statutes have been invalidated because
they were found to have an improper purpose of enforcing
morals qua morals."'
Two legislative approaches to the issue of human cloning
present themselves: enforcing a total prohibition on this form of
sexual reproduction in order to safeguard ideals of humaneness
and the sanctity of life-together with personal privacy and indi-
vidual autonomy-or promoting a selective regulation of cloning
thereby seeking to accommodate the humanitarian goal of pro-
viding infertile couples with biologically linked descendants and
thereby promote the improvement of the gene pool. 1 6
In March 1997, President Clinton banned the use of federal
funds for human cloning," 7 but settled subsequently on a five-
115. See Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding state
statute that prohibited delivery of birth control drugs and devices void because
it bore no real and substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare), affd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See also Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding statute that prohibited mere private
possession of obscene material in violation of First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
116. See Pizzulli, supra note 110, at 480. See generally Rick Weiss, Fertility,
Innovation or Exploitation?, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1998, at Al (exploring the
manner in which fertility clinics experiment on women, eggs and embryos).
On November 5, 1998, a scientific discovery of great magnitude was
announced: the primordial human cells, termed human embryonic stem cells,
from which an entire individual is created, had been identified and cultivated.
It is hoped eventually these cells will be used to grow tissues for human
transplantation or, for that matter, to introduce new or improved genes into
people. See Michael J. Shamblott et al., Derivation of Pluripotent Stem Cells from
Cultured Human Primordial Germ Cells, 95 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. Am. 13726
(1998); James A. Thompson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human
Blastocysts, 282 SCIENCE 1145 (1998). See also Rick Weiss, A Crucial Human Cell is
Isolated, Multiplied: Embryonic Building Block's Therapeutic Potential Stirs Debate,
WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1998, at Al; Rick Weiss, For Senate, .'Stem Cell'Advances Revive
an Embryonic Controversy, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at A2. But see Hanna Rosin,
Outside Laboratory, Moral Objections: Abortion Foes Oppose Embryo Research, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 1998, at A14; Rick Weiss, Can Scientists Bypass Stem Cells' Moral
Minefield?, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1998, at A3.
117. See Rick Weiss, Human Clone Research Will Be Regulated, WASH. POST,
Jan. 20, 1998, at Al. S. 368 and H.R. 922 of the 105th Congress seek a
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year work moratorium.118  In June, however, the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended federal legislation
be enacted to allow a limited number of scientists to create
cloned human embryos. The use of the embryos by implantation
to make cloned human babies would be prohibited however. 1 9
It has been determined that the Federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has the authority to regulate human clon-
ing. Thus, any efforts undertaken to attempt research in this
area must be initiated with the filing of a formal application to
the FDA which would then undertake a lengthy review. Anyone
failing to follow this procedure will be prosecuted. 2 0
Judicial Review
The standard ofjudicial review deemed appropriate for eval-
uating a total legislative prohibition of cloning would be deter-
mined by a primary determination of the extent to which a right
to clone is incorporated in the fundamental right of procreative
privacy. Thus, if sexual reproduction is recognized as a funda-
mental right, "the state must show a compelling interest in regu-
lating cloning which can only be furthered by a complete
ban."'' Further, since interests in preserving genetic variability
would-of necessity-entail selective regulation, a total ban
designed to further these interests would most probably be
unconstitutionally overbroad.' 22 Yet, the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments-whose undergirding values find expres-
permanent ban of federal funding for human cloning, while H.R. 923 seeks to
impose an outright ban on human cloning.
118. See id.; Guy Gugliotta, United Against Human Cloning Hill Leaders
Differ on Specifics, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1998, at A4.
119. See Rick Weiss, Panel Backs Some Human Clone Work, WASH. POST, June
4, 1997, at Al. In 1997, the California State Assembly became the first state to
legislate a prohibition on cloning a human being as well as the purchase or
selling of an ovum, zygote, embryo or fetus for the express purpose of cloning a
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sion in the interests in preserving the nuclear family unit as well
in protecting privacy and individual autonomy-might be
asserted to justify legislative programs designed to prohibit
cloning. 123
It can be seen clearly from this consideration that the judici-
ary will have interesting challenges to meet and resolve as the
moral, ethical, scientific, and medical issues of cloning are played
out within a legal framework. With any luck, however, the script
writers for Guiding Light will anticipate these complexities and
resolve them well in advance of their actual development in the
"real world."
CONCLUSIONS
For Justice Antonin Scalia, it is clear and unequivocal that
the best way to attack the vexing new social issues of contempo-
rary society is for Congress to draft the necessary laws to resolve
or regulate those issues and not expect the Supreme Court to
continuously reinterpret the U.S. Constitution in order to reach
desired results.124 Speaking before a leadership meeting of the
American Medical Association, Justice Scalia observed that after
Congress makes a judgment, "we do our job correctly when we
apply what Congress has written as basically and honestly as possi-
ble." '125 The Justice continued by stating: "If you have a very bad
statute, not only should you expect a result to be a very bad
result, I would argue that you should criticize the judges as being
in violation of their oath if they do not produce a bad result,
because it's not supposed to be our call."1 26
Chief Justice Burger held to the conviction that the law can-
not be expected to "steer" the course of medical science or
research but does have a duty to hold them in bounds and
thereby guarantee they are kept within society's speed limits.127
But query, who sets the speed limits? Who is the driver, and who
the passenger?
The dilemma for modem courts in their administration of
justice is to strike a balance-guided always by the standard of
reasonableness-between judicial activism (or Scalia passivity)
and deliberative democracy. Unduly weighting and trusting the
123. See id.
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democratic process almost assures an intellectual lethargy which
gives rise ultimately to ignorance and thereby assures the validity
ofJudge Richard Posner's conclusion that "most people are igno-
rant about most matters"' 2 8 -and here, most especially medical
science. Waiting for legislative blueprints to map the perimeters
of the New Biology is also an almost certain guarantee for egre-
gious delays and disappointments.
Aided by newly energized policies of scientific gatekeeping,
the judiciary has a high-powered vehicle to establish a tempered
level ofjudicial activism as certified architects or engineers of the
New Biology. Drawing upon the expertise of bioethical experts,
utilizing the Breyer approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence in
scientific cases, and re-evaluating the feasibility of implementing
a Biological Science Court will provide the judiciary with a fresh
opportunity to set about the business of developing and thereby
interpreting a new common law of biotechnology-all achieved
by using the traditional tools of legal analysis, deductive reason-
ing, public policy, and analogous applications of principles.
Even those who share Justice Scalia's conservative view of
judicial interpretation, and thus require themselves to react only
to those arguments framed by lawyers, cannot be unmindful of
the fact that lawyers choose among the possible arguments that
they make based upon their expectations of what will be accepta-
ble by the particular judges before whom they practice.129 It is
therefore incumbent upon judges to demonstrate a spirit of
open-mindedness and seek solutions to medico-legal dilemmas
spawned by the unbridled development of biotechnology. Show-
ing an open receptivity to entertain a variety of biomedical rea-
soning models-all in line with traditional legal analytic
frameworks-will go far to signal the practicing bar that they, in
turn, may advocate creative legal strategies for argumentation
instead of being rebuffed by unyielding judicial deference to a
legislative process sometimes totally incapacitated if not
moribund.
It has been suggested thatjudges and legislators alike should
follow the lead of physicians by learning "to tolerate uncertainty,
accept ambiguity, deal with the complex and turn away from
mere wonder."'13
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In the final analysis, then, judges-in the words of Car-
dozo-should not "yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence." '131 Rather, they should "exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disci-
plined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity
of order in the social life." ,132 Oliver Wendell Holmes saw his
first business as a judge was "to see that the game is played
according to the rules" whether he liked them or not.131 In the
bioethical and scientific decisionmaking cases of today and
tomorrow, I would suggest that the words of Cardozo and
Holmes shape the direction and the mandate of judicial analysis
and interpretation.
In the final analysis bioethics should be viewed as a natural
response not only to socio-politico-religious-ethical medical
dilemmas, but to increased knowledge and threatened rights, not
as a new discovery of basic principles.33 As such, bioethics does
not require application of a new morality. 3 ' Morality is neither
invented nor legislated. Rather, it is "discovered" by an unpack-
ing, explication, and articulation of individual intuitions about
what ought to be undertaken and what ought not be done.
When new lines of action are discovered, derived rules will
then emerge that, in turn, lead to defined results presenting new
conflicts with basic ethical and moral norms.' 3 6 While this pro-
cess of discovery evolves, it would be well to promote a new
debate on human rights among members of the legal community
as well as scientists, technologists, and philosophers which, in
turn, would hopefully guide and shape the whole process
itself. 1 37 Of necessity, the debate will focus its analysis on an
examination of the extent to which the plethora of legal, medi-
cal, scientific, philosophical, and technological considerations
combine within the brave new world to either challenge or com-
plement the more traditional rights of humanity. Once consid-
ered, it will then be necessary to decide whether a redefinition or
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reshaping of these rights is needed as a direct consequence of a
set of new contemporary values and standards emerging from
the complex bioethical conundrums of the twenty-first cen-
tury.'1 8 If realized, this debate will then give rise to and promote
a structure for legal coherence to complex bioethical decision-
making heretofore absent-all shaped and directed, as such, by
an enlightened judiciary.
138. See generally Schneider, supra note 6 (discussing the challenges
arising from the interface between law and bioethical issues).
